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Socio-economic and 
geographic profiling of crime 
in Chile
Mauro Gutiérrez, Javier Núñez and Jorge Rivera
M any empirical studies of crime assume that victims and 
perpetrators live in a single geographical unit, the implication being that 
the socio-economic characteristics of victims’ places of residence can 
be treated as determinants of crime. This study offers an alternative 
approach which consists in measuring crime by the proportion of alleged 
offenders in the whole population and treating the characteristics of their 
home communes as socio-economic causes of criminal behaviour. The 
conclusion is that those charged with crimes present a high degree of 
geographic mobility. In the case of economically motivated crimes, the 
evidence partly supports Becker’s propositions. Lastly, we show that the 
number of people charged with crimes tends to be greater in communes 
that have low incomes, a larger police presence, a predominance of urban 
areas with higher levels of education and a geographical location in the 
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Crime has increased in Chile over the past decade, 
becoming one of the foremost concerns for the public. 
Robbery and theft, for example, have increased by 12% 
and 13% a year, respectively, while homicides and drug 
offences have risen by 2% and 33%.1 This upward trend 
in crime has naturally aroused concern among citizens, 
who see it as one of the most important problems 
facing Chilean society today.2 Notwithstanding this, 
research into and knowledge of the determinants of 
crime in the country are still in short supply.
Ever since the pioneering work of  Ehrlich 
(1973), empirical and econometric studies of crime 
have allowed considerable progress to be made in 
understanding some of its fundamental causes.3 In 
most of these publications, crime is measured by the 
number of reported offences, and the socio-economic 
characteristics of the geographical areas concerned 
are treated as variables determining it, the tacit 
assumption being that the perpetrators come from the 
same place as their victims. Although this approach 
seems reasonable when large geographical areas are 
being considered, its explanatory power diminishes 
when these are heterogeneous or the perpetrator is not 
from the place where the crime was reported.4
This paper will attempt to deal with the limitations 
referred to by considering the geographical origin of 
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by an anonymous cepal Review referee on an earlier version of 
this article, and for those of Professor José Miguel Benavente and 
the participants in the Chilean Economic Society (sechi) meeting 
of September 2008. This study was partly financed by the National 
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (fondecyt), 
in conformity with Project No. 1070856 of  2007, “Un análisis 
del mecanismo de licitación de servicios de defensa: incentivos 
perversos, oferta criminal”. We are also grateful for the support of 
the Millennium Complex Engineering Systems Institute (isci).
1 See Anuario de estadísticas criminales 2008, published by the 
Paz Ciudadana Foundation. The annual growth rates are for 
reported crime.
2 According to the 2005 National Citizen Security Survey, 29% 
said that crime and drug trafficking were the greatest problems 
currently facing the country. Londoño, Gaviria and Guerrero 
(2000) put the cost of violent crime in Latin America at between 
5% and 13% of gdp.
3 Other early and influential econometric contributions were those 
of Wolpin (1980) and Dryden Witte (1980).
4 This type of approach could imply a proportional relationship 
between income level and criminality. See Rivera, Núñez and 
Villavicencio (2004) for a more detailed discussion.
alleged offenders instead of the place where the crime 
is reported by the victim. As far as we know, this is the 
first exercise of its kind in Chile and Latin America. The 
conceptual justification for this approach is that if  the 
propensity to commit crimes depends on the physical, 
social and economic environment of individuals, an 
analysis based on the alleged perpetrators’ places of 
origin and the relevant characteristics could shed new 
light on the determinants of crime in the country.
For this purpose, we used information from 
the criminal charges database of the Chilean Public 
Defender’s Office (dpp) for 2005 and 2006. The 
geographical unit of analysis was the commune and 
the figure taken was the number of people charged 
with crimes for every 100,000 inhabitants, divided by 
the types of crime recorded.5
Although people charged with crimes are not 
necessarily their perpetrators, the analysis was based on 
the idea that this was an imperfect but close measure 
given that a large and fairly constant proportion of 
them are found guilty of the crimes for which they 
are tried.
One of the findings of the study is that, for most 
crimes, there are communes which are not home to 
any suspects at all. This made it necessary to develop 
a procedure that could deal separately with the issue 
of the number of suspects from each commune and 
with the situation where there were none at all, and 
this was done using a Heckit model calculated by 
maximum likelihood. Estimates were made for different 
types of crime, the explanatory variables used being 
5 The dpp database contains data on practically all criminal 
proceedings conducted in the country in recent years. The information 
on each individual charged includes, among other things, age, sex, 
declared income, crime charged with, duration of the proceedings 
and penalty handed down by the judge. In particular, it records 
the individual’s domicile and commune of origin and the place 
where the crime was alleged to have been committed. Chile is 
divided for administrative purposes into 15 regions, 51 provinces 
and 342 communes. Communes contain an average of  about 
50,000 inhabitants, with a high degree of geographical dispersion. 
All the socio-economic data on communes used in this study are 
from the National Socio-economic Survey (casen), which has 
been conducted nationwide every two years since the late 1980s. 
These surveys are used to gather certain significant data about the 
population in each commune, such as age structure, income level 
and household characteristics and composition. The present study 
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legal or illegal income, the likelihood of punishment 
and the characteristics of  the home communes of 
those charged. This is the so-called selection model 
described further on.
To complement this, a crime participation 
model was developed and estimated in this study to 
establish the factors determining the likelihood of a 
person being charged with a crime, considering the 
variables normally employed in studies of the subject 
and the communes suspects come from. The latter 
consideration is one of the innovations that set this 
study apart from earlier work. The conclusions thus 
arrived at agree with the findings of other research 
carried out in Chile using regional data on reported 
crime (Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio, 2004).
The paper is structured as follows. After this 
introduction, section II presents some stylized facts 
on the behaviour of reported crime by offence type 
that arise when the geographical origin of suspects 
is taken as the unit of analysis. Section III describes 
the theoretical and econometric model applied in this 
study and the data used in the estimates. Lastly, sections 
IV and V present the findings and conclusions of the 
study, respectively. The annex contains tables setting 
out the econometric results discussed in the body of 
the text, together with a more detailed discussion of 
the relationship between crime and its attribution 
that supports our decision to evaluate crime at the 
communal level with reference to the numbers charged 
with but not necessarily guilty of offences.
II
Stylized facts
This section offers and discusses a number of 
stylized facts concerning the communes of  origin 
of those charged with crimes in Chile, touching on 
some issues that will be dealt with in the sections 
that follow. Table 1 shows the number of communes 
where residents were charged with the offences named 
and the percentage they represent out of the total of 
335 communes with information available for 2006. 
The data reveal that there are crimes for which the 
“commune non-participation” rate is as high as 31% 
(homicide), while others (larceny and assault) are 
more widespread geographically.
This information is new, since although earlier 
studies concluded that crime patterns differed 
substantially by geographical area,6 in Chile at least 
the existence and proportion of  communes where 
residents were charged with virtually no crimes in 
certain categories had not come to light. This raises 
the question of  what factors may account for the 
presence or otherwise in a particular community of 
people who are charged with and perhaps guilty of 
crimes, a subject that will be addressed later on using 
the so-called participation equation.
6 See, for example, Fundación Paz Ciudadana (2008), Benavente 
and Melo (2006), Defensoría Penal Pública (2007), Núñez and 
others (2003) and Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio (2004).
TABLE 1 
Communes where residents have and have not been charged with crimes,
by type of offence
(Number of communes and percentages of the total)
 Robbery Non-violent Larceny Assault Homicide Sex offences  Drug
  robbery     offences
No 67 20.0 32 10.0 18 5.0 10 3.0 104 31.0 44 13.0 74 22.0
Yes 268 80.0 303 90.0 317 95.0 325 97.0 231 69.0 291 87.0 261 78.0
Source: criminal charges database 2006, Public Defender’s Office (dpp).
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Owing no doubt to a lack of detailed information, 
studies on the subject tend to infer that criminals live 
in the geographical area examined. The charge data 
call this assumption into question, however, as they 
reveal that the numbers depend greatly on the size 
of the area considered. As table 2 shows, only about 
half  of all charges brought in a given commune are 
against residents of  that commune. Nonetheless, 
large percentages of those charged are from the same 
province or region, implying that the mobility of 
possible perpetrators is constrained by geographical 
distance.
As regards the age composition of  alleged 
offenders, table 3 shows that a large proportion are 
minors, particularly in the case of property crimes 
(robbery, non-violent robbery and larceny).
The data also reveal an apparent inverse correlation 
between age and the likelihood of being charged. As 
figures 1 and 2 show, the indicator of net participation 
by age (defined as the percentage of people aged x who 
are charged minus the percentage of the population 
of that age) is higher for young people than for other 
age segments of the population.7
7 Various authors have found evidence that young people are more 
likely to take part in criminal activities. The reasons for this behaviour 
range from the psychological aspects of adolescence to a gloomy 
view of future legal earning potential because of the low wages 
earned by this age group, with its lack of experience and training. 
See Buonanno (2003a), Freeman (1996) and Freeman (1991).
TABLE 2
Mobility of alleged offenders between 
communes, provinces and regions
(Percentages resident in the geographical area 
concerned)
Type of  offence Communes Provinces Regions
Robbery 51 87 93
Non-violent robbery 58 88 93
Larceny 43 79 88
Assault 64 91 94
Homicide 58 87 93
Sex offences 61 87 91
Drug offences 51 82 86
Source: criminal charges database 2006, Public Defender’s Office 
(dpp).
TABLE 3
Crimes with which minors are charged
(Percentages)








Source: criminal charges database 2006, Public Defender’s Office 
(dpp).
FIGURE 1
Net alleged participation in robbery, non-violent robbery and larceny, by age
(Percentages)
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To complement this information, a preliminary 
inference can be drawn from figure 3 that there is 
an inverse relationship between education level and 
the number of people charged by type of offence: 
as education levels rise, the indicator of  criminal 
participation (defined as the percentage of  people 
charged who have an education level x minus the 
percentage of  the population with that level of 
education) diminishes. This relationship has been 
identified by a number of authors (Lochner, 1999; 
Lochner and Moretti, 2001; Buonanno, 2003a; 
Buonanno, 2003b; Buonanno and Leonida, 2005), 
although other studies contain findings that show 
the opposite (Ehrlich, 1973; Núñez and others, 2003; 
Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio, 2004).8
8 Ehrlich (1973) put forward three possible explanations: (i) that 
education may increase the returns on illegal activities, (ii) that 
this relationship may be due to more educated victims being more 
likely to report crimes and (iii) that more educated people are more 
likely to be victims of crime because they have higher incomes. The 
last two hypotheses are linked to the way crime is defined (i.e., by 
reported crime statistics), which does not allow the perpetrator’s 
place of origin to be identified.
FIGURE 2
Net alleged participation in assault, homicide and sex and drug offences, by age
(Percentages)
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  data from the Public Defender’s Office.
FIGURE 3 
relationship between alleged crime and education level, by type of offence
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Lastly, the data show a positive correlation 
between the number of people charged with offences 
and the different types of  offence. Table 4 allows 
us to establish that the highest correlations are for 
economically motivated crimes (robbery, larceny, 
drugs), suggesting the presence of  a number of 
common determinants that do not play a very 
important role in offences with non-economic motives 
(homicide, sex offences). These last usually have a 
low level of correlation with the other types of crime, 
suggesting that their causes are different from those 
of  economically motivated offences.
The subject will be looked at later, since one 
of  the major conclusions of  this study is that the 
determinants of crime differ by the type of offence. 
The same conclusion has been arrived at in other 
studies on Chile conducted using reported crime data 
(Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio, 2004). 
III
Description of the model and the data used
This section describes the general model developed 
to identify the determinants of crime. Following the 
static model proposed by Ehrlich (1973), we take an 
individual representative of the commune concerned, 
hereinafter i = 1,2,…,335, who spends his or her time
carrying out legal  or illegal  activities related
to a particular offence, hereinafter j = robbery, non-
violent robbery, larceny, assault, homicide, sex offences 
and drug offences.9
9 All the information on criminal charges brought comes from the 
dpp criminal charges database for 2006, which gives a classification 
of 236 crimes grouped into 17 categories. The present study takes 
what we consider to be the main categories of offence, given their 
social implications; their exact composition is given in Defensoría 
Penal Pública (2007). The 2006 database contains records of 
202,328 cases handled by the dpp. Commune-level socio-economic 
and demographic information, meanwhile, comes from the casen 
2006 survey.
It will be assumed that no entry or training 
costs have to be incurred prior to carrying out these 
activities10 and that the returns to them increase 
constantly in proportion to the time spent on them. 
However, the returns to illegal activities are uncertain 
as they depend on penalties and the likelihood of 
being caught. Thus, given the logic of the individual 
concerned and considering a utility function U(.), 
that individual’s optimization problem consists in 
maximizing the expected utility given by:
10 This assumption has been widely discussed, as it implies that 
a person can move between criminal and legal activities without 
cost, yet a criminal record is often a barrier to obtaining legal work 
and this can have an inertial effect that causes people to persist in 
criminal activities. According to Buonanno (2003a), it has been 
shown that a very high percentage of criminals carried on legal 
activities before turning to illegal ones.
TABLE 4 
Correlation between the number of people charged with offences per 100,000 
inhabitants, by commune and offence type
Offence Homicide Sex offences Economic crimes Assault Robbery Larceny Drug offences
Homicide 1.000 0.372 0.080 0.193 0.119 0.137 0.202
Sex offences  1.000 0.148 0.478 0.097 0.093 0.150
Economic crimes   1.000 0.403 0.669 0.650 0.546
Assault    1.000 0.295 0.419 0.312
Robbery     1.000 0.803 0.492
Larceny      1.000 0.521
Drug offences       1.000
Source: criminal charges database 2006, Public Defender’s Office (dpp).
N.B.: Includes only communes where residents were charged with these crimes in 2006.
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 (1)
subject to  , where      is the total 
income obtained by spending       units of time on 
legal activities and  is the corresponding 
illegal income;  
is the total income received by the individual if  
caught, which happens with probability pij  involving 
punishment of  , while  
represents the income received by the individual if not 
captured, for which the likelihood is 1 -  pij. On the 
basis of this optimization problem, the relationship 
between illegal and legal activities is defined by the 
following equation:
  (2)
If  the payoff  for illicit activities involving the 
likelihood of punishment is lower than that for legal 
activities, the person will not spend time on the former. 
For a crime to take place, therefore, the marginal 
income expected from a particular illegal activity 
minus the possible punishment for committing the 
crime must be greater than the marginal income from 
a legal activity, i.e.:
  (3)
For the purposes of the estimation it is assumed 
that, first, individuals must decide whether to commit 
crimes (participation decision), for which they evaluate 
equation 3. If  they do so decide, they take a second 
decision which consists in determining how much time 
they will spend on the criminal activity (charge rate 
equation) in accordance with equation 2. Accordingly, 
to take account of the possible selection bias that the 
presence of a correlation between the two decisions 
would entail, the charge rate and participation 
econometric estimates were calculated using Heckit 
models, by maximum likelihood, assuming that the 
errors presented a bivariate normal distribution.
The participation decision, taken using equation 3,
will be positive if illegal income net of possible penalties 
exceeds legal income. Given that no information is 
available on the illegal income received by agents, 
however, let alone that yielded by crimes of type j, a 
proxy variable was used in the form of per capita income 
 in the region to which the alleged perpetrator’s 
commune of  origin belonged. It is feasible to use 
a proxy of  this sort because the opportunities for 
obtaining illegal income are related to the wealth 
that might be available to victims, most of whom (as 
shown in the previous section) are from the region 




The proxy for legal income was average income in
the commune ; to capture possible disparities 
in its distribution, however, the percentage of poor 
people in the commune (poori) was included as 
an additional variable.11 The model considered 
unemployment in the population aged 18 to 40 as a 
variable (unemploymenti ) to take account of actual 
opportunities for obtaining legal income.12 Given 





Meanwhile, it is assumed that the punishment 
function fij is equivalent to the penalty imposed by 
law on crimes of type j, i.e. ( ), which would be 
the same in all communes depending on the type of 
crime involved. Its effects cannot be determined for 
11 Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) studied aggregate crime 
in various countries and found the influence of income disparities 
to be significant, which is why it was considered important to 
include it here.
12 As indicated earlier, however, it has been shown that a majority of 
individuals who commit crimes are in work. Imrohoroglu, Merlo and 
Rupert (2001) estimated that about 70% of criminals in the United 
States were in work at the time they committed their crimes.
166
SoCIo-EConomIC AnD GEoGRAPhIC PRofILInG of CRImE In ChILE  •  mAURo GUTIéRREz, JAVIER núñEz AnD JoRGE RIVERA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 8  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 9
the purposes of our estimate, as they will be included 
in the constant term of the equations.
In the light of  the criticisms of  Block and 
Heineke (1975) and William and Sickles (2002) (see 
also Buonanno, 2003c), we included the following 
sociodemographic variables, which are considered to 
be determinants of crime and are routinely employed 
in studies of  the subject: (i) the percentage of  the
population aged between 13 and 17 (popi
13-17
), (ii) 
the percentage of the population aged between 18 
and 40 (popi
18-40
), (iii) the percentage of single-parent 
households headed by the mother (housei
fem
), (iv) the 
percentage of households containing minors aged 13 
to 18 in which both parents work (housei
parents-work
)13 
and, lastly, (v) average years of education of over-13s in
the commune (educi).
Given the above, the punishment applied in 
commune i for type j crimes can be expressed by the 
following equation:
  (6)
where  is the constant already mentioned.
Following the hypotheses put forward by Becker 
(1968), the variable pij representing the possibility of 
being punished depends on the likelihood of capture
, the level of crime that goes
unreported    and the 
possibility of being found guilty, which is conditional 
on being captured .
For the purposes of the estimate, it was assumed 
that the likelihood of capture was a function of the 
number of police stations in the commune  = 
 (stationi)= 14 and that the number of offences 
that went unreported in the different communes was 
constant. The likelihood of  being punished once 
captured ( ) was estimated from the ratio 
between the number of those charged who were found 
guilty and the total number charged in the region, 
13 William and Sickles (2002) show that the family and local 
environment play a major role in driving criminal behaviour.
14 Police information is taken from the official statistics of  the 
Chilean national police service (Carabineros de Chile) published 
on the web page of the Chilean National Institute of Statistics, 
police statistics section [online] www.ine.cl.
both for 2005.15 Accordingly, the likelihood of being 
punished is represented by the following equation:
  (7)
where  and 
underreport  is the constant indicated.
When rewritten and supplemented by a random 




It should be pointed out that in the above equation 
a commune i will present positive charge rates always 
provided that S ij > 0. Generally, for any type of crime, 
15 In point of fact, the lack of national information for 2005 meant 
that the variable was constructed using data from the second half  
of that year. They were lagged on the assumption that they could 
be observed by individuals in the following period.
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let us define the dichotomous variable H i whose 
value is 1 if  commune i presents charges for the crime 
analysed and 0 otherwise. The participation equation 
for the offence concerned can be estimated using a 
probit model, assuming variable  is normal, with 
a mean of 0 and a variance of :
  (9)
As for those charged with offences, criminal 
activity levels are determined using equation 2 and by 
the time constraints on the representative individual. 
This equation shows that the number of  people 
charged with each type of offence is a function of the 
same variables as the participation equation. For the 
purposes of the estimation, however, it was considered 
appropriate to express the number of people charged 
in log form using equation 10, whose variables have a 
linear relationship plus a random term. To properly 
identify the participation equation, some variables 
were excluded from the charge rate equation (a topic 
that is discussed in the following section), so that this 
was expressed as follows:
  (10)
where . Nonetheless, given that
crime is only observable when Sij is greater than 0, the 
existence of a possible correlation between the random
 and error terms of the participation equation means 
that the conditional error term cannot be equal to 0, 
which tends to bias the least squares estimate. Thus, 
to control for any idiosyncratic differences between 
communes, we included the following variables,16 which 
were also included in the participation equation: (i) 
the dichotomous variable small – communityi, which 
takes the value 1 if  commune i has less than 7,000 
inhabitants; (ii) the dummy variable rurali, which 
takes the value 1 if  the rural population of commune 
i is greater than 50% of the total; (iii) densityi, which 
represents the number of  inhabitants per square 
kilometre in commune i; (iv) the dichotomous variable 
north, which takes the value 1 if  commune i is in the 
country’s north (region I, II, III or IV); and (v) centre, 
which takes the value 1 if  commune i is in region V 
or VI or the Metropolitan Region. The participation 
equation also included the distancei variable, which 
measures the distance between commune i and the 
main urban centre of the region concerned.
Following Sah (1991), we also included the 
number of people charged with crimes in the province, 
expressed in logarithms (Lncrimprov), on the hypothesis 
that certain areas may have higher levels of  crime 
because there is a lower probability of capture, so 
that the inhabitants of the communes concerned will 
revise their expectations and show a more significant 
propensity to engage in illicit activities. Thus, the final 
equation to be estimated is expressed as follows:
  (11)
Assuming that the error terms of the two equations
 come from a normal distribution 
of means 0, with variances 
 
  and covariance
, the conditional error can be calculated
using the following equation:
  (12)
where  ρ is the correlation coefficient of the participation 
and charge rate equations, while λ(.) is the inverse 
Mills ratio. The coefficients of the two equations were 
estimated using the maximum likelihood method to 
ensure consistency of the estimators.17
16 Various studies have shown that small communities tend to have 
lower rates of crime because criminals would find it harder to go 
unnoticed there (Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio, 2004; Glaeser 
and Sacerdote, 1999).
17 Purely by way of explanation, it should be pointed out that the 
analysis was not undertaken by estimating an unbalanced panel 
for the following reasons: (i) lack of information prior to 2006 on 
the communes of origin of many of those charged with offences; 
(ii) lack of annual data on the explanatory variables during the 
relevant period, since these come from the casen surveys held 
every two years or so; (iii) possible undercounting of offenders 
in some communes because potential criminals moved from their 
region of origin to areas where the criminal law reform had yet 
to be implemented. Implementation of this was gradual: the last 
region to be incorporated into the new system was the Metropolitan 
Region (Santiago) in 2005. See Defensoría Penal Pública (2007) 
for further information.
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Because the charge rate equation by offence category 
is the one that offers the most interesting results, the 
main findings from this will now be presented and 
commented upon (the results of the other estimates 
are detailed in annex 2).
The results concerned were obtained using two 
econometric specifications for each type of offence: one 
that included all the variables presented previously and 
one that only included variables which were significant 
at 90% (reduced model), retaining however the most 
important economic variables  
 irrespective of statistical significance.
Notwithstanding this, while the theoretical 
analysis undertaken indicates that the determinants 
of participation in criminal acts are also those that 
account for the level of crime (charge rate equation), 
the distance variable was included only in the 
participation equation so that it could be correctly 
identified (Heckman estimate). For the same purpose, 
other variables from the charge rate equation were 
omitted from the reduced models to improve the 
identification of the equations.18
Using the test of  independence between the 
charge rate equation and the participation equation 
(the Wald test, at 90%), it was not possible to reject 
the hypothesis of independence, except in the cases 
of homicide and sex crimes, which is tantamount to 
stating that the charge rate equation could be estimated 
on the basis of the observed crime level. The results 
of the two equations are presented in the annex.19
To validate the foregoing result, the correlation 
between the Mills ratio and the explanatory variables 
of the charge rate equation was analysed to discard 
high correlations that might affect the validity of the 
test and the consistency of the coefficients estimated. 
As described in annex 2, R2 levels below 57% were 
found in all the reduced models, indicating that the 
correlation between the Mills ratio and the explanatory 
variables of the charge rate equation is low.20
The results of the charge rate equation by category 
of offence could be interesting. First, they indicate 
that while there are some cross-sectional determinants, 
there is a high degree of heterogeneity between those 
charged with the different offences, suggesting that 
different causes and motivations are at work.
Communal income levels, meanwhile, show an 
inversely proportional relationship to crime, with a 
coefficient significant at 99% for all offences (except 
homicide, which does however have the expected 
sign). This finding agrees with the theoretical model 
predictions and indicates that it is in the poorest 
communes that people are most likely to be charged 
with a wide range of offences. The elasticities associated 
with communal income levels (see annex 2) range 
from –0.25 in the case of assault to –0.65 in that of 
non-violent robbery.
In the case of  offences whose motivation is 
clearly economic (robbery, non-violent robbery and 
larceny), the relationship between regional income 
and the number of people charged is positive and 
significant, by contrast with other offences that may 
not be economically motivated. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis about the opportunities for illegal 
earnings represented by economically motivated 
offences. According to the result of the estimates, the 
elasticities associated with the latter range from 0.52 
(larceny) to 0.97 (non-violent robbery).
The effects of the deterrence variable are only 
significant for crimes associated with the drugs 
law. Unemployment in the commune is statistically 
significant only in the case of robbery, which agrees 
with the theoretical model, and has an elasticity of 
0.23. There is a positive relationship, meanwhile, 
between education and the number of people charged 
IV
results
18 The variables omitted for identification purposes in the 
participation equations for the different offences were as follows. 
For robbery: distance, centre, small-community, rural and poor; for 
non-violent robbery: distance, pop 13-17, poor, house-parents-work 
and unemployment; for larceny: distance and educ; for homicide: 
distance, pop 18-40, north and educ; for sex offences: distance, pop 
13-17, rural and unemployment, and for offences classified in the 
drugs law: distance, north, small-community and unemployment.
19 The crime of assault was not studied in the participation equation 
as it is present in 97% of the communes analysed.
20 The procedure implemented is similar to that used by Elias and 
Okseniuk (2002), who applied the recommendation of Nawata and 
Nagase (1996). See [online] http://www.aaep.org.ar/espa/anales/
PDF_02/elias_okseniuk.pdf.
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with the offences of robbery and larceny, a result that 
appears to bear out the findings of other studies in 
Chile and around the world.
People are more likely to be charged with a wide 
range of offences in the communes of the north of Chile, 
a finding that bears out previous studies (Núñez and 
others, 2003; Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio, 2004).
The proportion of young people in a commune 
does not significantly affect the number of people 
charged by category of offence, except in the case of 
assault, which has an elasticity of 0.48. Fewer people 
21 See, for example, Rivera, Núñez and Villavicencio (2004) 
and Núñez and others (2003), where it is likewise observed that 
economic factors play an important role, chiefly in economically 
motivated crimes.
tend to be charged for a variety of offences in rural 
communes. Lastly, the number of police stations in 
a commune has a large and significant effect on the 
number of people charged for all offences other than 
homicide, although the sign is positive for this as well. 
The meaning of this finding is ambiguous. It may reflect 
the success of police efforts to apprehend criminals, 
but it could also be because police stations are more 
likely to be situated in communes whose populations 
are particularly likely to offend. The true meaning of 
this sign remains an open question.
V
Conclusions
This study represents an effort to examine the 
determinants of crime from the perspective of the places 
of origin of those charged with offences, rather than 
following the traditional approach of employing data 
based on reported crime and treating the place where 
the offence was recorded as the suspect’s place of origin. 
Thus, the present study recognizes the geographical 
dissociation between victims’ and perpetrators’ home 
areas, so that the characteristics of the former’s places 
of  residence become a determining factor in the 
propensity to commit crime (illegal income).
This study shows that about half  of all reported 
crime is notified outside the commune of residence of 
the perpetrator, albeit in the same region in the great 
majority of cases, which indicates that it would be 
inappropriate to base the analysis on reported crime 
at the communal level. Again, studies based on data 
for criminal charges brought at the regional level could 
have limitations if  social and economic heterogeneity 
within regions is high, as it is in Chile and the other 
countries of Latin America.
Another striking finding of  this study is the 
high level of correlation between the communes of 
residence of  those charged with different types of 
crimes, raising the question of why so many people 
are charged in these. The study notes that while the 
causes of criminal acts differ, some are transversal. 
In particular, other things being equal, the number 
of people charged with offences tends to be greater 
in poorer communes, those in urban areas, those in 
the north of the country and those with higher levels 
of education. This last finding has come up in other 
studies on Chile and other parts of the world, although 
there is still debate as to its interpretation.
Unemployment, meanwhile, does not greatly 
influence the number of people charged with offences, 
and nor does the deterrence variable (the likelihood of 
being captured in a given commune in earlier periods). 
Police presence, measured by the number of police 
stations in the commune, markedly increases the 
number of people charged in the various communes 
for almost all types of crime.
Another finding of interest is that opportunities 
for obtaining illegal income, for which regional income 
is used as a proxy, tend to increase the number of 
people charged in each commune only in the case of 
crimes for which these are relevant, i.e., those whose 
motivation is mainly economic (robbery, non-violent 
robbery and larceny), and not for other types of offence 
(homicide, assault, sex offences). These findings agree 
with those of earlier studies on Chile21 and suggest 
that when crimes are not economically motivated, it 
is necessary to seek explanations and determinants in 
other approaches and disciplines, such as sociology 
and psychology.
There are all sorts of areas in which future research 
could be done on the determinants of crime with regard 
to the places of origin of suspects and perpetrators. In 
particular, it would be well worth studying the persistence 
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of criminal behaviour over time, a subject which this 
study, as a cross-sectional analysis, could not address. 
It would also be interesting to differentiate between 
first-time and repeat offenders, on the assumption that 
the latter could have embarked upon a career of crime. 
Again, there is scope for analysing a wide range of 
crime determinants at the regional level where adequate 
conceptual or theoretical support exists, in addition 
to the determinants included in this paper.
Lastly, it should be added that non-rejection of the 
hypothesis of independence between the participation 
and selection equations is not necessarily due to any 
identification problems with the latter. Although 
the decision to participate might depend on socio-
economic variables, the empirical evidence indicates 
that it is not linked to the level of crime, contrary to 
what the theoretical approach applied in this study 
would suggest.
AnnEx 1
Relationships between crime and its attribution
Ideally, the charge rate indicator in a given geographical 
area should be the ratio between the percentage of people 
who have participated in criminal activities and the percentage 
residing in that area. One of the problems with analysing 
crime, however, is the existence of components that are not 
observable and rule this out as a direct approach.
As was pointed out in the introduction, studies of crime 
generally use reported crime databases, so that the place of 
origin of alleged offenders cannot be determined. Another 
problem with this approach is the number of crimes that go 
unreported, an issue we attempted to solve by using panel 
data techniques or assuming it was random.
While the approach followed in this document obviates 
the first of these problems, it is affected by underreporting, 
since a person cannot be charged with a particular crime unless 
accused of it by the victim or public prosecutor. In addition 
to the points made in the previous paragraph, however, use 
of the charge ratio is open to objections from a legal point 
of view, in that those charged are implicitly being treated as 
responsible for crimes without having been found guilty by 
a judge, and there is the possibility that an innocent person 
may be apprehended, found guilty or both.
As can be appreciated in equation 1A, however, using the
charge ratio is valid if the    ratio is 
random or can be captured by one of the observable variables, 
such as police effort or socio-economic characteristics. For 
the present study, we took it that this factor did not depend 
on socio-economic causes, and accordingly proceeded to 
correlate the degree of criminal liability with per capita 
income levels, finding very low values. Nonetheless, the 
effect of police presence was controlled for by including a 




cri = number of people involved in a particular criminal activity.
crirprtd = number of people involved in a criminal activity who are reported, whether identified or not.
criunrprtd = number of people involved in a criminal activity who are not reported.
crirprtd-captd = number of criminals reported and captured.
crirprtd-uncaptd = number of criminals reported and not captured.
inoccaptd = number of innocent people captured and charged.
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